陆王进路的事功观对当代新儒学之外王学的启发探析

32阳明文化陆王进路的事功观对当代新儒学之外王学的启发探析□ 杨自平摘要：当代新儒家唐君毅、牟宗三致力掘发先秦、宋明儒学的内圣学特色，如何进一步思考内圣学与外王学的关联，实为重要课题。本文拟以陆九渊、王阳明心学的外王观为题，考察陆、王系统下的外王学特色，进一步思考继唐君毅、牟宗三、徐复观之后当代新儒学外王学的可能发展。唐、牟着重陆王的成德之教，另外针对时代问题提出新外王学。随着时代变迁，时代议题已产生变化，在功利价值盛行的今日，有必要重新思考外王学方向。陆、王承自孔、孟的事功观是德业的理想，迥异于世俗功利的事功观。对现今社会带来的启发是，吾人应以成为现代君子为志向，重视道德价值，不问功利利害，正视当下所处分位，本于道德动机，为所当为，随时自省，功成不居，不计较个人得失与世俗评价。回到儒家道德事业的事功观，正是陆、王事功观对现今社会的重要启发。关键词：陆象山 王阳明 当代新儒学 牟宗三 唐君毅作者杨自平，台湾“中央大学”中文系主任、教授（台湾 桃园 32001）。一、前言 [见英文版第34页，下同]自1949年后，两岸儒学分道扬镳，港台主要是以熊十力（1885—1968）、唐君毅（1909—1978）、牟宗三（1909—1995）、徐复观（1904—1982）等一系，加上方东美（1899—1977）、钱穆（1895—1990）等为代表。大陆儒学早期以唯物思想为主，郭齐勇提出以李泽厚、汤一介、张立文、蒙培元、牟钟鉴、陈来五位学者为代表，指出早期的这批学者关注“文革”及市场开放后社会的反省，一方面受西方思潮影响，另一方面又承接儒家传统，期以儒家资源应对时代挑战。又指出：“不同程度地受到唯物史观的a“他们还受到现代西方哲学‘拒斥形上学’‘反本质主若干影响，往往肯定食衣住行，社会实践。”b义’的影响，……把真实的‘情’放在最高地。”随着两岸开放，两岸儒学学者密切交流，近年虽似出现港台新儒家与大陆新儒家的蒋庆、陈明、康晓光、余东海、秋风等人的对垒，但这批学者只能代表近期大陆儒学发展的一部分。这五位学者，致《近年来中国大陆儒学的新进展》，《广西大学学报》2015年第1期。a 郭齐勇：《近年来中国大陆儒学的新进展》，《广西大学学报》2015年第1期。b 郭齐勇：力上溯清代公羊学，呼吁重新建立儒教中国，并出版了《中国必须再儒化——“大陆新儒家”新主张》一书。书中蒋庆大肆倡议重建儒教。对于该书主旨，葛兆光指出：全面提出当下大陆新儒学的政治诉求与文化理念，不仅试图给执政党重新建立合法性，而且提出关于未来中国的“通盘构想”，据称这是“儒家自‘文革’后第一次集体发声，吹响了复兴儒学，回a归道统，儒化中国的集结号”。33陆王进路的事功观对当代新儒学之外王学的启发探析亦即这批学者致力将儒家的政治思想与中国当代政治接轨，欲建构未来中国政治的理想蓝图。对于两岸儒学的发展该如何看待，李明辉质疑港台新儒家与大陆新儒家的区分，颇值得参考。李明辉指出：1949年以前的新儒家、1949年以后的港台新儒家，以及改革开放以后的大陆儒家所面对的问题都不一样，因此关注的问题焦点有所不同，这是很自然的。在某一意义下，出现“大陆新儒家”的b说法似乎也自然的。亦即港台新儒家与大陆新儒家的区分并不是身份标签的对立，而是关注议题的不同，故李明辉认c同方朝晖“大陆儒学新思潮”的说法。葛兆光曾指出2014年到2016年大陆儒学发展有三大特征：第一，“大陆新儒学已经脱离港台新儒家的影响”；第二，“大陆新儒学关怀的中心，已经从文化转向政治”；第三，“大陆新儒学的领袖们，不再甘于在寂寞的学林中‘坐而论道’，而是要从幕后走到台前，挽袖伸臂参与国家政治与制度的设d其中第三点似针对港台新儒家强调内圣学，尤其牟宗三的“良知坎陷”说，外王学需由内圣学计。”转出。两岸儒学的未来发展，各自有必须突破的课题。就港台新儒学而言，对陆、王思想多重视内圣学层面，外王学方面则思考如何契接西方的科学知识，唐君毅反省的是知识过度扩张对人类社会造成的e就现今而言，吾人已普遍接受西方的民主、科危害，牟宗三则提出道德理性“曲通”开出观解理性。学的知识体系，如何正视现今过于强调知识分化，及重视功利价值的商品化社会，实为重要课题。现在有许多学者关切儒家的事功学，但多偏向强调实际致用，或建立制度，功利倾向愈发明显。随着时代课题的转变，重新正视儒家道德事业的事功观恐有其必要性。本文以陆九渊（1139—1193，字子静，学者常称其为“陆象山”）、王守仁（1472—1529，字伯安，世称阳明先生）的外王观为题，考察陆、王心学外王学特色，进一步思考继唐、牟的新外王学的可能发展。二 、唐君毅、牟宗三论陆王心学 [35]唐君毅对象山思想的理解，认为象山承继孟子，主张先立本心、扩充心量，不断提升境界，最终实现吾与宇宙为一体的理想。唐氏云：“应先立其大本，立大本即是扩大心量，提升心境，最后达至f‘宇宙即吾心，吾心即宇宙’的境界。这即是孟子万物皆备于我、浩然之气充塞天地。”二○《异想天开——近年来大陆新儒学的政治诉求》，《思想》2017年总第33期。a 葛兆光：《关于“新儒家”的争论：回应澎湃新闻访问之回应》，《思想》2015年总第29期。b 李明辉：《关于“新儒家”的争论：回应澎湃新闻访问之回应》，《思想》2015年总第29期。c 李明辉：《异想天开——近年来大陆新儒学的政治诉求》，《思想》2017年总第33期d 葛兆光：《唐君毅先生、牟宗三先生的“新外王”思想》，《儒学的现代诠释与时代关怀》，台北：台湾学生书局，2017年，第436—437页。e 杨自平：《略谈宋明清学术的共同问题》，《哲学论集》，台北：台湾学生书局，1990年，第568页。f 唐君毅：一八年第一期 总第14期 34阳明文化牟宗三的象山学则有三项特色：一是确认象山学是孟子学，并深切掌握象山辨志及明本心的重要观点。牟氏云：“象山先令人辨志，先明本心即理，盖其经典的宗主在孟子，而实事实理之宗主则在ab二是指出象山学重在立本，并非不重视思维表现或不能展现分析性。三是指出道德的实践也。”c但牟氏认为象山这种圆教思想，早已见象山将孟子性善说加以开展，将心即理发展成绝对普遍性。d并声称：“此种圆教只允许一道德的形上于孔子的践仁知天及孟子的尽心、知性、知天的观点中，e又云：“乃是绝对普遍的‘本心即学，而不允许一形上学的道德学，它复亦不是气化宇宙论中心。”f理’‘本心即性’之心体中心、性体中心，故心外无物，道外无事也。”至于唐氏对阳明的理解与评价，唐氏认为阳明的观点虽近于象山，但却由朱子学发展而来。与象g至于从朱子学转出，山同处于“心即理”“圣贤与愚夫愚妇之心同理同”“学贵反诸心”等观点上。主要是就阳明初期及致力诠解《大学》“格物致知”而言。唐氏云：“由钱德洪之年谱，可知阳明初治h朱子学。……阳明之所以不满于朱子之‘格物穷理’与‘心及理’之论，皆正由先治朱子之学出来。”又云：“阳明之格物致知之论，则由朱子之格物致知之论发展出……阳明之论心之体用、未发与已发、i唐氏认为此与象天理与人欲、存养与省察、戒慎恐惧等内心修养工夫问题，皆是承朱子之说而出。”j故唐氏断言阳明思想与朱子关系较密，与山强调先立本有关，与罕言体用、已发未发等问题有关。k象山关系较疏。综观上述，唐氏对阳明定位的分判，着重的是渊源层面，即此认定阳明与朱子关系较近，而非义理系统，认为阳明与象山同属一系。关于阳明与朱、陆的关系，牟氏的看法是：“其主要问题是对朱子l唐氏、牟氏对阳明学与朱、陆之而发则无疑……其学之义理系统客观的说乃属孟子学者亦无疑。”关系，看法一致，就渊源而言阳明对朱子学有所反省，提出不同见解；但在义理系统与象山同属孟子一系，皆主张心即理。然明显可见的是，唐氏治阳明学较偏重如何由朱子转出，牟氏则偏重阳明学义理本身，关注阳明论良知本体及对《大学》“格物致知”之诠释。牟氏的阳明学亦有四点特色：一是确认阳明学是孟子学，牟氏云：“孟子之槃槃大才确定内圣之m又云：“王阳明之言良知乃自始学之弘规，然自孟子后，除了陆象山、王阳明外，很少能接得上者。”n即是道德的，故必然是孟子学。”二是阳明学的重心所在是透过对《大学》的重新分解，提出致良知以对治朱子顺取的格物穷理。o《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，台北：台湾学生书局，1990年，第7页。a 牟宗三：“然其所吃紧者示人者则在先明轻重本末。”（牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第7页）b 牟氏云：“‘心即理’之达其绝对普遍性而‘充塞宇宙’也。”（牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第19页）c 牟氏云：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第20页。d 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第21页。e 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第21页。f 牟宗三：《阳明学与朱子学》，《哲学论集》，第508页。 g 唐君毅：《阳明学与朱子学》，《哲学论集》，第509页。 h 唐君毅：《阳明学与朱子学》，《哲学论集》，第509页。 i 唐君毅：《阳明学与朱子学》，《哲学论集》，第509页。 j 唐君毅：《阳明学与朱子学》，《哲学论集》，第509页。 k 唐君毅：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第216页。l 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第216页。m 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第221页。n 牟宗三：“阳明之学是重新分解以立义，即就《大学》重解，提出致良知以对治朱子顺取的格物穷理说。”（牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺o 牟氏云：山》，第21页）三是牟氏指出阳明对孟子思想的开展处有四点：其一，将孟子的四端之心提升代表本心。牟氏认a其二，诠解道德为：“阳明依此义而把良知提升上来代表本心，以之综括孟子所言的四端之心。”35陆王进路的事功观对当代新儒学之外王学的启发探析本心为当下即是的良知本体。牟氏云：“凡此皆是就超越的道德本心展转引申。……本心具有种种实b“良知本体就在当下感性，每一实性皆是其当体自己。……本心并没有一个隔离的自体摆在那里。”应之是非之决定处见。……分解地言之，言良知本体，言超越的道德本心，具体地言之，则言‘当下即c其三，强调良知的绝对普遍性，具有形上实体义，是一切存在的存有论依据。牟氏云：“良知是’。”d“良知亦有其形而上的实体之意不但是道德实践之根据，而且亦是一切存在之存有论的根据。”e其四，在致良知的工义……‘道德的形上学’……乃是实践的形上学，亦可曰圆教下的实践形上学。”f牟氏又解夫实践上，“致”除了有孟子推扩的涵义，尚有“复”的涵义，牟氏称之内在的逆觉体证。释“逆觉体证”只是“那良知明觉随时呈露时之震动，通过此震动而反照其自己。故此逆觉之觉就是那g良知明觉之自照。”四是牟氏指出阳明对《大学》的“格物”“致知”“诚意”“正心”作出创造性诠释。其一，阳明认为良知能使意念及意念所向之事物得其正。牟氏云：“（良知）它本身的真诚恻怛，就具有一种不容已h其二，阳明认为良知地要实现其方向（天理）于意念乃至意念之所在（物）以诚之与正之之力量。”i其三，阳明所说的事能完全作主，一切意念都是良知天理的流行，事与物皆出于良知明觉之感应。与物不是就客观外在对象而言，而是强调事、物乃良知本体的流行作用。牟氏云：“物亦不是对感性知性而为对象的物，即不是作为现象的物，必是作为“物之在其自己”的物……但可是明觉感应之非对j象的如象，亦即智的直觉之所照之非对象的如象。”唐氏亦进一步指出陆、王学在现今学术的意义，他认为陆、王学肯定圣人所以为圣是在成德不在博学多能，这样的观点有两个意义：一是使读书人不自恃知识多寡，而重成德，二是使读书人，或一般人了解所禀受之心性与圣人同，不可自暴自弃。唐氏云：陆王之言圣贤不尚多知多能，一方面使学者不以知能相矜，而通体是道义；而在另一方面，则使学者自知其知能不及世所谓圣人者，其心其理之未尝不与圣人同，而免于自暴自弃；又一方面则使k天下人皆可知“此心此理”之未尝不与圣人同。顺此，唐氏更指出其积极意义在于：“让成德之学，不为世之学者所得而私，以为天下之愚夫愚父l所共有……亦皆各就其知识技能之相近者以为学，以成就其异业而同道之至治之世而已。”《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第217页。a 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第222页。b 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第222页。c 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第223页。d 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第222页。e 牟宗三：“阳明言‘致’字，直接地是‘向前推致’底意思，等于孟子所谓‘扩充’。‘致良知’是把良知之天理或良知所觉之是非善恶不f 牟氏云：让它为私欲所间隔而充分地把它呈现出来以使之见之于行事，即成道德行为。”又云：“‘致’字亦含有‘复’字义。但‘复’必须在‘致’中复。”“在此致中即含有警觉底意思，而即以警觉开始其致。‘警觉’亦名曰‘逆觉’。”“故逆觉中即含有一种肯认或体证，此名曰‘逆觉体证’。此体证是在其于日常生活中随时呈露而体证，故此此证亦曰‘内在的逆觉体证’，言其即日常生活而不隔离。”（牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第229－230页）《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第231页。g 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第238—239页。h 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第239页。 i 牟宗三：《从陆象山到刘蕺山》，第242页。 j 牟宗三：《朱子与陆王思想中之一现代学术意义》，《哲学论集》，第505页。k 唐君毅：《朱子与陆王思想中之一现代学术意义》，《哲学论集》，第505—506页。l 唐君毅：二○一八年第一期 总第14期 36阳明文化因此，唐、牟二子对于陆、王的学术定位、渊源、特色及现代性皆深入说明，明确揭示陆、王对孟子学的承继与开展，及陆、王思想的异同，深切掌握陆、王成德思想的特色。以下将进一步探讨，在心学系统下的事功学的现代意义。三、陆王进德修业的事功观及具体实践 [37]清初遗民反省明朝灭亡，常以心学盛行、士子空谈心性，无力承担家国重任为重要原因，故清初顾炎武及颜李派强调经学及事功之学以救正时弊。致使后人常误以为心学空谈心性，不重事功。然考察象山、阳明生平事迹实非如此，且二子亦重视事功。此外，阳明学传到日本，发展出具有日本特色的阳明学，强调行动、革命。虽然异于两岸阳明学的发展，但也意味着阳明学亦有事功这个面向。吴震曾就日本儒学探讨日本阳明学的发展，并以三岛由纪夫为例，指出：“这是将阳明学说成是行动哲学、斗争哲学，而且是‘日本化’‘本土化’了的‘革命哲a学’。”到底陆、王是否只有内圣而不谈事功？若亦谈事功，则陆、王的事功观及具体实践为何？以及陆、王思想体系的事功学特色为何？以下将予以考察。关于陆、王是否只有内圣学而不谈事功这点，答案是否定的。象山曾明确指出：岂儒者之道，将坐视土地之荒芜，府库之空竭，邻国之侵陵而不为之计，而徒以仁义自解，如徐偃王、宋襄公者为然耶？不然！则孟子之说，亦不可以卤莽观。而世俗之蔽，亦不可以不深究而b明辨之也。世以儒者为无用仁义为空言，不深究其实，则无用之讥，空言之诮，殆未可以苟逃也。象山认为儒者并非空言仁义，然时人却误解儒家不关心世事，对此不可不辨。可见象山认为儒家不是只谈内圣，亦关注外王事功。但陆、王对于事功的认定有三点特色极特殊：一是主张事功并非只有施政表现，圣贤的修身、齐家亦是事功。象山云：至于帝王之德之仁，岂但如匹夫见于修身齐家而已之说，愚窃以为不然。夫所谓修身、齐家者，非夫饰小廉，矜小行，以自托于乡党者然也。颜子视听言动之间，曽子容貌颜色辞气之际，而五帝、三王、皋、夔、稷、契、伊、吕、周、召之功勋、德业在焉。故《大学》言“明明德于天下者”，取c必于格物、致知、正心、诚意之间。二是强调圣贤不会标榜建立事功，只谈进德修业，一切事业皆依于本心，当为而为。阳明认为圣贤并非无功业，其境界远超过世人所说的事功。阳明云：“圣贤非无功业、气节，但其循着这天理，则便d又云：是道，不可以事功、气节名矣。”君子之事，敬德修业而已。虽位天地、育万物，皆已进德之事，故德业之外无他事功矣。乃若不由天德，而求骋于功名事业之场，则亦希高慕外。后世高明之士，虽知向学，而未能不为才力所使e者，犹不免焉。《漫谈阳明学与阳明后学的研究》，郭齐勇主编：《阳明学研究》（第2辑），北京：中华书局，2017年，第3页。a 吴震：《策问》，《象山全集》（卷二十四），台北：台湾中华书局，1987年，第4页。b 陆九渊：《问德仁功利》，《象山全集》（卷三十），第5—6页。c 陆九渊：《王阳明全集》，吴光等编校，上海：上海古籍出版社，2014年，第109页。d 王守仁：《王阳明全集》，吴光等编校，第1058页。e 王守仁：三是主张有道德心，无事功心，不计较得失利害，方能坦荡自在。吾人身涉世间，难免面临各种人事利害干扰，只有彻底植基于道德，方能不受各种毁誉干扰，问心无愧。阳明曾有一段名言：我在南都已前，尚有些子乡愿的意思在。我今信得这良知真是真非，信手行去，更不着些覆藏。我a今才做得个狂者的胸次，使天下之人都说我行不掩言也罢。37陆王进路的事功观对当代新儒学之外王学的启发探析既然陆、王亦不废事功，陆、王事功学的特色为何？关于事功学，不宜只有特定谈法，例如只关注执行面，而是可以有不同面向的探讨，理论层面、执行层面，价值观、动机论、结果论等。首先，在理论层面，陆、王的事功学有五大要点：一、强调事功学的开端需先确立人生价值观，并确立志向，抉择成为君子或常人。二、若立志成为君子，则一切行事依于道德价值。三、随时自省，保持动机的纯粹。四、依所处分位，为所当为，彻底执行。五、用心面对所接下的责任，认真学习，时时自省。象山在第一点及第二点，乃承继孔、孟的义利之辨。虽然象山亦承继孟子人皆有道德本心，但人易受欲望所影响。故象山云：“义也者，人之所固有也；果人之所固有，则夫人而喻焉可也。然而喻之者b因此，象山首重辨志、立志，所辨、所立是指君子、常少，则是必有以夺之而所志习之不在乎此也。”人，及道德价值、功利价值的抉择。至于第三点，象山认为确立志向后，则需就切己处随时自省，反省是否陷溺于物欲，是否知不善而不能改。象山云：“而或至于戕贼陷溺，颠迷于物欲，而不能以自反，则所可耻者亦孰甚于此c又云：“不善之不可为，非有所甚难知也，人亦未必不知，而至于甘为不善而不之改者，是无耻哉？”d此外，所习之事亦必合于义，从动机到所知所为皆依于道德价值。象山云：“夫子言‘君子喻于也。”义，小人喻于利。’孟子谓‘欲知舜与跖之分，无他，利与义之间也。’读书者多忽此，谓为易晓，故躐等e又云：陵节，所谈益高而无补于实行。”苟不切己观省，亦恐未能有益也。某平日读此不无所感，窃谓学者于此当辨其志，人之所喻由其所习，所习由其所志。志乎义则所习者必在于义，所习在义，斯喻于义矣；志乎利，则所习者必在于利，f所习在利，斯喻于利矣。故学者之志不可不辨也。至于第四点，象山则强调行事当依于道德价值，不断精进，彻底执行。象山云：“大端既明，趋向g既定，则明善喻义，当使日进，德当日新，业当日富。”关于第五点，阳明强调正视所接下的责任，用心面对。阳明的致良知便是在责任中落实。曾就回应一官员的看法，阳明云：有一属官，因久听讲先生之学，曰：“此学甚好，只是簿书讼狱繁难，不得为学。”先生闻之，曰：“我何尝教尔离了簿书讼狱，悬空去讲学？尔既有官司之事，便从官司的事上为学，才是真格物。如问一词讼，不可因其应对无状，起个怒心；不可因他言语圆转，生个喜心；不可恶其嘱托，加意治之；不可因其请求，屈意从之；不可因自己事务烦冗，随意苟且断之；不可因旁人󽫚󻯙󼋞󽚯󺎬󼯦󼣋󽋢󼮼󻒦《王阳明全集》，吴光等编校，第132页。a 王守仁：《君子喻于义》，《象山全集》（卷三十三），第4页。b 陆九渊：《人不可以无耻》，《象山全集》（卷三十三），第3页。c 陆九渊：《人不可以无耻》，《象山全集》（卷三十三），第3页。d 陆九渊：《与傅子渊》，《象山全集》（卷六），第2页。e 陆九渊：《白鹿洞书院〈论语〉讲义》，《象山全集》（卷二十三），第2页。 f 陆九渊：《与傅子渊》，《象山全集》（卷六），第1页。g 陆九渊：二○一八年第一期 总第14期 38阳明文化之；这许多意思皆私，只尔自知，须精细省察克治，惟恐此心有一毫偏倚，枉人是非，这便是格物致a知。簿书讼狱之间，无非实学。若离了事物为学，却是着空。”阳明认为他的良知学并非只是谈修身，就司法官员审理案件，便须让断案程序、结果公平公正，不可以私意妄断。世俗谈事功，常将内圣、外王分裂为二，谈事功则依于功利价值，强调事理原则。阳明曾评论世人所推崇的春秋五霸，及苏秦、张仪的纵横事功，点出世人只见其外功效，却见不到未能出于道德本心。阳明曾评五霸云：“如五伯攘夷狄，尊周室，都是一个私心，便不当理。人却说他做得当理，只心有未b五霸建立尊王攘夷的大业，但阳明点纯，往往悦慕其所为，要来外面做得好看，却与心全不相干。”出一切出于功利心，未以道德心为依归。至于苏秦、张仪，阳明评道：苏秦、张仪之智也，是圣人之资。后世事业文章，许多豪杰名家，只是学得仪、秦故智。仪、秦学术，善揣摸人情，无一些不中人肯启，故其说不能穷。仪、秦亦是窥见得良知妙用处，但用之于不善尔。c世人徒慕苏、张的才智，但阳明认为二子擅长揣摩人心，口才高明，甚至可能也窥见良知妙用，但没有善用，而用在功利事功。从阳明对谦逊才敏之人的不同认定，亦可见出其间差异。阳明云：夫谓逊志务时敏者，非谓其饰情卑礼于其外，汲汲于事功声誉之间也。其逊志也，如地之下而无所不承也；如海之虚而无所不纳也。其时敏也，一于天德，戒惧于不睹不闻，如太和之运而不息也。d意即一般谦逊才敏之人，看似表面谦恭，实则为求功求名，真正的谦逊才敏之人是表现谦虚之德，顺应本心，敬谨而勤奋。陆王事功观的独特处在于，二子认为儒家并非将内圣、外王割裂为二，而是视为一体，即当修身则认真修身，当齐家则用心齐家，当治国则尽心治国，完全依于本心，依道德天理而行。象山曾云：凡动容周旋，应事接物，读书考古，或动或静，莫不在时。此理塞宇宙，所谓“道外无事，事外无道”。舍此而别有商量、别有趋向、别有规模、别有形迹、别有行业、别有事功，则与道不相干，则是异e端，则是利欲为之陷溺，为之旧窠，说即是邪说，见即邪见。象山主张道事不二，道在事功显，离事功外无道。阳明亦曾言：“良知只在声色货利上用功，能致f又云：“但圣人格物，便更熟得良知，精精明明，毫发无蔽，则声色、货利之交，无非天则流行矣。”g不仅面对得些子，不消费力。如此格物，虽卖柴人亦是做得。虽公卿大夫以至天子，皆是如此做。”事情须用心处理，合于道德天理，圣人则甚至到熟稔的地步，即从容中道，不逾矩。因此，当阳明面对违背亲情的诉讼案，处理方式便异于一般人，不是审判父子谁是谁非，而是透《王阳明全集》，吴光等编校，第107—108页。a 王守仁：《王阳明全集》，吴光等编校，第137页。b 王守仁：《王阳明全集》，吴光等编校，第130页。c 王守仁：《与唐虞佐侍御》，《王阳明全集》，第204—205页。d 王守仁：《语录》，《象山全集》（卷三十五），第31页。e 陆九渊：《王阳明全集》，吴光等编校，第139页。f 王守仁：《王阳明全集》，吴光等编校，第137页。g 王守仁：a过智慧以道理开导，化解父子争讼，维护亲情，避免人伦悲剧。39陆王进路的事功观对当代新儒学之外王学的启发探析综观陆王的事功观，承继孔、孟的义利之辨，主张依所处分位，基于道德本心，当为则为，以道德价值为权衡，不考虑功利价值。这样的事功观，是圣贤理想的事功观，非一般出于功利价值的事功观，内圣、外王一体，差别只在所处分位，当慎独则慎独、当齐家则齐家、当治国则治国。从动机、过程、结果皆强调合于道德天理，无私人利害考量，故不会出现有才无德、内外不一、以私害公的现象。因此，若有人认为陆王只重内圣不重事功，则应如此理解，陆王不谈世俗的事功，他们所重视的是德业的事功。四、结论 [41]唐氏、牟氏对陆王思想的诠解，着重陆王的成德之教，强调良知的发用，这确实是陆王学特色所在，然也容易让后人误以为陆、王只重视内圣，不重视外王。但这不是唐氏、牟氏诠解的问题，回到陆、王学本身来看，这确实是心学着力所在。透过重新思考陆、王如何承继孔、孟的事功观，便可面对后人对唐、牟诠解的质疑，或象山当时面对时人质疑儒家空言仁义，甚至清初学者质疑王学空疏的现象。陆、王关注的目标是成为圣贤，强调先立志，若抉择成为圣贤，便走上异于一般人的人生道路。这条圣贤大道，是以道德本心作为行事根源，以进德修业作为努力方向。内圣、外王的区分只在所处分位的不同，依不同分位，修身或经世。现今欲发展儒家事功学，需留意三件事：一是事功观有不同认定标准，二是需肯定儒家亦重视事功，三是儒家的事功学有不同进路。陆、王进路的事功学是承自孔、孟的事功观，重视德业的理想，迥异于世俗功利的事功观。对现今事功学的启发在于，以成为现代君子为志向，重视道德价值，不问功利利害，正视当下所处分位，本于道德动机，为所当为，随时自省，功成不居，不计较个人得失及世俗评价。这种意义下的事功，才是儒家理想的道德事业。若不明于此，可能产生陆、王不重事功的误解，抑或即便肯定陆、王重事功，而发展出即知即行的革命事功观，皆与陆、王本旨不符。现今事功学有重功利价值的倾向，重新正视陆、王事功观有其必要性。综合陆、王事功观对现今儒家事功学有四点重要启发：一是确立志向，确认价值抉择；二是勇于担当，面对当为之事或不当为之事，毅然承担；三是发展事功需时时自省，检视是否完全出于道德本心；四是事功完成后能真正放下，不居功、不恋栈。这样的事功学，是完全基于道德价值，不计个人私利，甚至不以公利作考量。这正是重新回到陆、王事功学的必要性所在。（责任编辑：张发贤 责任校对：丁 羽）二○一八年第一期“乡人有父子讼狱，请诉于先生，侍者欲阻之。先生听之，言不终辞，其父子相抱恸哭而去。柴鸣治入问曰：‘先生何言，a 《传习录》记载：致伊感悔之速？’先生曰：‘我言舜是世间大不孝的子，瞽瞍是世间大慈的父。’鸣治愕然请问。先生曰：‘舜常自以为大不孝，所以能孝。瞽瞍常自以为大慈，所以不能慈。瞽瞍只记得舜是我提孩长的，今何不曾豫悦我，不知自心已为后妻所移了，尚谓自家能慈，所以愈不能慈。舜只思父提孩我时如何爱我，今日不爱，只是我不能尽孝，日思所以不能尽孝处，所以愈能孝。及至瞽瞍底豫时，又不过复得此心原慈的本体。所以后世称舜是个古今大孝的子，瞽瞍亦做成个慈父。’”（王守仁：《王阳明全集》，吴光等编校，第127页） 总第14期 34Toward a New Confucian Doctrine of Outer Kingliness: Lessons from the Lu–Wang View of Meritorious WorksYang Tzu-PingAbstract: elements of the pre-Qin and Song New Confucians Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan worked to uncover the unique For them, a truly pivotal problem was how best to understand the connection between inner –Ming Confucian philosophy of i n ner sageliness studies. sageliness and outer kingliness. In this article we examine the characteristic features of the Lu–Wang School’s views on outer kingliness as a point of departure for thinking further about possible developments in outer kingliness thought in the era following Tang, Mou, and Xu Fuguan. Given the present rise of utilitarian values, we have particular need of such a new examination, for the concepts of virtue that Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yfrom Confucius and Mencius could not be more di󰁱angming drew of meritorious works, and the weighty contribution they offer to contemporary society is erent from the secular utilitarian view precisely to return us to Confucian views of virtue and mission.Keywords: Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming, New Confucianism, Mou Zongsan, Tang JunyiIt has been traditional for New Confucian philosophers in Hong Kong and Taiwan to concentrate their studies of Lu Xiangshan (a.k.a. Wang Shouren 陆象山 (1139–1193) and Wang Yangming 王阳明 (bridges to Western scientific learning. What concerned Tang Junyi 内圣) and center such interests as they have in outer kingliness (王守仁, 1472–1528) on the two men’s philosophies of inner sageliness 外王) on how best to build was the crisis to human society posed by the runaway growth of knowledge, and what Mou 唐君毅 (1909–1978) Zongsan be derived 牟宗三universally accepted Western scienti󰁲indirectly (1909–1995) proposed was a way that theoretical reason could perhaps from moral reason.1what to make of the c and democratic systems, the pressing question is now But in the present day, when we have already of our societies. Though we now have a great many scholars who are concerned with over-emphasis on intellectualization and the utilitarian consumerization Confucian views of meritorious accomplishments, most of them incline strongly toward  Yang Tzu-Ping is professor and chair of the Department of Chinese Literature at t he National Central University of Taiwan. E-mail: tpyang3@gmail.com1 Yang Tzu-Ping 杨自平, New Confucianism: Its Mod e rn Interpretation and Views on the Times [儒学的现代诠释与时代关怀] (Taipei: Taiwan Student Bookstore, 2017), 436–437.T󰁫󰁥󰁡󰁬󰁟 󰁡 N󰁮󰁥 C󰁫󰁣󰁤󰁢󰁨󰁧󰁡󰁣 D󰁫󰁨󰁭󰁬󰁧󰁣󰁮 󰁫󰁤 O󰁢󰁭󰁮󰁬 K󰁧󰁣󰁺󰁝󰁧󰁣󰁮󰁪󰁪studying their normative construction or practical application, thus ironically revealing even more strongly their utilitarian biases. What is needed now, in view of our changing times, is a new acquaintance with Confucian views on the great moral mission of meritorious works.Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan on Outer Kingliness [Refer to page 33 for Chinese. Similarly hereina󰁯 er]Tang Juny i believed that, following Mencius’s lead, Lu Xiangshan advocated, First establishing the great foundation, which is no di󰁱of the heart-mind and raising one’s state of awareness, and finally attaining a spiritual erent that expanding the capacity state in which the cosmos and one’s own mind seem perfectly coextensive with one another. 󰁴and spoke of vast, over󰁳 is was what Mencius meant when he said that all things are contained in us owing energy that pervades heaven.2 affirmed that Lu’s philosophy was a continuation of Mencius’s philosophy and grasped Mou Zongsan’s views on Lu Xiangshan were marked by three key features. First, he incisively Lu’s views on “establishing one’s ambitions as recognizing one’s original mind.” As Mou wrote, “When Lu directed people who would establish their ambitions first to recognize that their original mind is identical to principle, his canonic precedent was in Mencius, but his real-life precedent came from none other than moral practice.”3Mou noted that though the emphasis in Lu Xiangshan’s work was on establishing the great Second, basis, this in no way implied anti-intellectualism or an incapacity for analysis.4a󰁶 󰁴 ird, Mou developing the equation between the mind and principle into an absolute universality. rmed that Lu further extended the Mencian doctrine of the goodness of human nature, 5However, Mou believed there was already an ancient precedent for Lu’s propensity toward this sort of perfect teaching (Heaven by practicing mind to know one’s nature and know Heaven,” and he claimed, ren 仁 (benevolence)” and Mencius’s doctrine of “completing the 圆教) all the way back in Confucius’s doctrine of “knowing Such a perfect teaching is only compatible with a moral metaphysics, not a metaphysics of morals. . . . Because of this absolute primacy of the metaphysical realities of the mind (and nature (mind as nature,” there are no things outside of mind and the Way.性体) re󰁳 ected in doctrines that “the original mind as principle” and “original 心) 6close to Lu’s, it also represented a development out of the ideas of Zhu Xi As for Wang Yangming, Tang Junyi thought that though Wang’s point of view came Where Wang had common ground with Lu was in his view that because the mind is 朱熹 (1130–1200). principle, “even fools possess the very same mind and the same principle as the sages and worthies,” and in his conviction that “what is most to be prized in learning is to re󰁳the mind.”7was what he wrote about Wang’s early attempts to reinterpret the concept of “investigating What chie󰁳 y lay behind Tang’s opinion about Wang’s indebtedness to Zhu Xi ect on things to extend one’s knowledge” (格物致知) in the Great Learning:From Qian Dehong’s applied himself first to the thought of Master Zhu . . . His dissa 钱德洪 (1496–1574) chronology of Wang’s life, we can see that he accounts of “investigating things to extend one’s knowledge” and “the mind as principle” tisfaction with Zhu ’ s 2 Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Philosophical Compendium [哲学论集] (Taipei: Taiwan Student Book, 1990), 568.3 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan [从陆象山到刘蕺山] (Taipei: Taiwan Student Book, 1990), 7.4 “What he was working hard to do was show people the importance of di󰁱and the inconsequential and secondary.” Ibid. erentiating between the essential and weighty 5 “[It is here that the] ‘mind as principle’ becomes absolutely universal and su󰁱 uses the whole cosmos.” Ibid., 19.6 Ibid., 21.7 Tang, Philosophical Compendium, 508.3536C󰁫󰁣󰁤󰁢󰁨󰁧󰁡󰁣 A󰁨󰁡󰁟󰁮󰁠󰁞 V󰁫󰁝.󰁜, N󰁫.󰁛 (2018)stemmed entirely from his having begun his studies with the works of Master Zhu. . . . Wang’s reworking of the concept was a development out of Zhu’s version . . . and his accounts of questions having to do with inward spiritual work—such as (substanceti–yonghappiness], of heavenly principle and human desire, cultivation and reflection, and –function), of the times before and a󰁯 er the arising [of joy, anger, grief, and 体用 caution and fearfulness—all are inherited from Master Zhu.8Hence Tang concluded that Wang’s relationship to Zhu was a very close one and his connection to Lu rather more distant.philosophy according to its points of origin, not its doctrinal system, resulting in Tang We can see from this that Tang was judging Wang Yangming’s place in Chinese placing Wang close to Zhu Xi. And Mou Zongsan opined, “󰁴his main that his doctrinal system belongs to the Mencian line.”problematiques from Master Zhu. . . . Objectively speaking, there is also no doubt ere is no doubt that Wang got 9and Mou agreed about Wang Yangming’s relationships to Zhu and Lu, Tang emphasized We can see, then, that although Tang Wang’s ideas as outgrowths from Zhu’s, whereas Mou focused more on Wang’s doctrines themselves and Wang’s notions about ontological substance and his re󰁲 guring of investigating things and extending knowledge.liangzhi 良知 (intuitive knowledge) as the basic is Mencian. Second, he saw the center of this philosophy as lying in Wang’s reinterpretation Mou’s views on Wang have four key features. First, he a󰁶 rmed that Wang’s philosophy of the intuitive knowledge)Great Learning, wherein he “put forward his idea of zhi liangzhithings in order to plumb their principles.” to correct Zhu’s path of ‘following [the senses]’ ( 致良知 (extension of 10顺取) to investigate He “elevated 󰁴 ird, Mou advanced the thesis that Wang innovated upon Mencius in four ways: (1) Four Sprouts”;liangzhi 11to a representative of the original mind that could encompass Mencius’s ontological substance, which is (2) He interpreted the original moral mind as the “here-and-now” basic saying that “liangzhi;12 (3) He emphasized the universality of liangzhi, all existence”;liangzhi 13is not just the basis of moral practice but also the ontological basis of just the Mencian meaning but also the sense of restoring ( (4) concerning the practice of zhi liangzhi, Wang saw in the word zhi 致 not moral awareness (on oneself in response to the [inner] rumbling of enlightened 逆觉体证).14 Mou also explained returning to moral awareness as “re󰁳复), which Mou called returning to liangzhi when it stirs.”15 ection concepts from the Fourth, Mou asserted that he engaged in some creative interpretation concerning such intention sincere (can Wang believed that give uprightness to intention and the things and a󰁱诚意Great Learning ), and rectifying the mind as investigating things, extending knowledge, making ( 正心). First, Wang believed that airs that are its objects.16 Second, liangzhi of liangzhi can be in complete control, that all intention is the flowing ganyingliangzhi 感应’s heavenly principle, with affairs and things all emerging from its enlightened (operation and response).17 Third, Wang did not think of these affairs and 8 Tang, Philosophical Compendium, 509.9 Mou, From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan, 216.10 Ibid., 21.11 Ibid., 217.12 Ibid., 222.13 Ibid., 223.14 Ibid., 229–230.15 Ibid., 231.16 “[and its objects in order to make them sincere and upright.” Ibid., 238–239.Liangzhi’s] sincerity and concern has a sort of power to realize its orientation (the heavenly principle) in intention 17 Ibid., 239.T󰁫󰁥󰁡󰁬󰁟 󰁡 N󰁮󰁥 C󰁫󰁣󰁤󰁢󰁨󰁧󰁡󰁣 D󰁫󰁨󰁭󰁬󰁧󰁣󰁮 󰁫󰁤 O󰁢󰁭󰁮󰁬 K󰁧󰁣󰁺󰁝󰁧󰁣󰁮󰁪󰁪things as objectively exterior objects; rather he emphasized that they are the flowing functioning of liangzhi as the basic ontological substance.18philosophy. It teaches that what makes sages sagely is their virtue, not broad learning or Tang Junyi also went on to discuss the contemporary significance of Lu–Wang great talent, and this has two upshots. 󰁴the degree of their knowledge but instead must look to their virtue; the second is that e 󰁲 rst is that intellectuals must not be smug about neither intellectuals nor ordinary folk must understand that they are endowed with the very same mind and nature as the sages themselves and must not succumb to discouragement.19From here Tang went on to state his larger point: “That the learning of virtue is di󰁱from worldly learning because it is something available universally, even to the ignorant, . . . erent and that each person can equally use such knowledge as he or she has to accomplish their respective jobs while all pursuing the same Way.”20sources, hallmarks, and modern significance of Lu–Wang thought; they showed that To summarize the foregoing, then, Tang and Mou had much to say about the place, the two men were successors and developers of the Mencian inheritance, and they were sensitive to the differences in the two men’s ideas and what was special in their thinking about virtue. Next we will give further exploration to the modern signi󰁲about meritorious works in the School of the Mind. cance of their views 󰁋 e Lu–Wang View of Meritorious Works of Virtue and 󰁋 eir Speci󰁊 c Practice [36]󰁴a lot of empty talk among the literati about the mind and nature and o󰁱 ere was a widespread impression in the early Qing that the School of the Mind involved handling the weighty responsibilities of family and empire, and they blamed that in large ered nothing for part for the fall of the Ming dynasty. 󰁴the followers of Yan Yuan stress on the study of the classics and practical learning to counter the ills of their day. 󰁴颜元 (1635–1704) and Li Gong us it was that Gu Yanwu 李塨顾炎武 (1659–1733) laid such (1613–1682) and attitude led posterity to misunderstand the School of the Mind as something that neglected is practical learning, but a study of Lu’s and Wang’s lives and accomplishments shows just how wrong this is. Moreover, when Wang’s thought traveled to Japan, it developed into a particularly Japanese form that emphasized action and revolution. 󰁴direction than in China, it also serves to show that Wang’s teachings have an aspect to ough it took a di󰁱 erent them that is related to meritorious works. As Wu Zhen of Yukio Mishima 吴震 has said, speaking speci󰁲 cally philosophy of action, of struggle, and it is a Japanized, localized philosophy of revolution.”三島由紀夫 (1925–1970), “This presents Wang’s philosophy as a 21also could encompass a great deal of practical accomplishments related to outer kingliness. Lu Xiangshan thought that Confucianism was not just a matter of inner sageliness but He wrote,18 “󰁴objects. Instead, they necessarily refer to ‘things-in-themselves’ . . . the non-object suchness of enlightened ings here do not refer to the objects of the senses and understanding or [to put it di󰁱 erently] things in the sense of intellectual intuition.” Mou, From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan, 242.ganying or 19 Tang, Philosophical Compendium, 505.20 Ibid., 505–506.21 Wu Zhen 吴震, “Musings on the Philosophy of Wang Yangming and His Latter-Day Followers” [], in vol. 2 of Studies on the Philosophy of Wang Yangming [谈阳明学与阳明后学的研究阳明学研究], ed. Guo Qiyong 郭齐勇 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2017), 3.3738C󰁫󰁣󰁤󰁢󰁨󰁧󰁡󰁣 A󰁨󰁡󰁟󰁮󰁠󰁞 V󰁫󰁝.󰁜, N󰁫.󰁛 (2018)How could it be that the way of the scholar would mean sitting idly while while watching the earth go barren, contemplating the empty granaries, and standing aside as neighboring countries invade the land, waiting for benevolence and rectitude to stop the depredations on their own, . . . Never! 󰁴the world’s ills, for they must be studied and discerned carefully. Worldly people look on e sayings of Mencius are not to be disregarded, bu t nor are the scholar as useless and benevolence and rectitude as empty words, and without deep investigation of practicalities, there can scare be any avoiding such ridicule.22recognizes them as including not just governance but also personal cultivation and domestic But the Lu–Wang approach to practical affairs is special in three respects. First, it a󰁱 airs. As Lu says,Some people doubt that emperors’ and princes’ practice of virtue and benevolencereally be like that of ordinary people’s cultivation of their own persons and the ordering of could their families, but I beg to di󰁱family is not a matter of pursuing a comfortable prosperity and petty a󰁱 er. What is called self-cultivation and the ordering of one’s one’s standing among the fellow villagers. . . . Thus it is that when the airs to advance speaks of “enlightening all under heaven with brilliant virtue,” the meaning must be Great Learning sought in investigating things, extending knowledge, rectifying the mind, and making intention sincere.23accomplishments but only speak of developing greater virtue and attending to worthy The second thing is that they make clear that sages and worthies do not flaunt their enterprises, where all such works are founded on the original mind, which unfailingly does what it is that ought to be done. Wang wrote that “sages and worthies are not without great accomplishments and ambitions, but they move to the dictates of heavenly principle and the Way and do not build their fame upon those things.”24entailed in what ordinary people think of as great accomplishments. Wang also wrote, “󰁴 󰁴 eir spiritual states far exceed those works of a nothing else. 󰁴junzi e them all is the work of perfecting virtue still more greatly, so that there are no other great ough they stand between heaven and earth and nourish myriad things, for 君子 (perfected person) are just to honor virtue and carry out their duties, accomplishments beyond just that.”25on accomplishments. Only by not stooping to count gain and loss can it be magnanimous 󰁴 ird, Lu–Wang thought only advocates a mind oriented toward morality, not one focused and equipoised. Only by taking 󰁲and blame and keep a clear conscience. As Wang Yangming famously said, rm root in morality can one remain unperturbed by praise Before I was in Nanjing [following the suppression of the Prince of Ning rebellion], I still was subject to some weaknesses and irresolution. But now that I understand true right and wrong, I have con󰁲 dence in my actions and no longer feel inhibited.liangzhi26 and what exactly do their philosophies say about them? On this topic, it is best to distinguish a Given that Lu and Wang do not spurn practical accomplishments by any means, number of di󰁱 erent aspects, namely theory, practice, values, motives, and results.that at the outset of learning about practical a󰁱On the theoretical level, the Lu–Wang approach has 󰁲for human life and set one’s ambition, whether one will remain an ordinary person or airs, one must 󰁲 ve key points: First, it emphasizes rst establish a value system become a perfected person. Second, if one sets one’s mind on the latter, than one’s every deed must rely on moral values. Third, there must be regular self-reflection to keep the 22 Lu Xiangshan fasc. 24, 4.陆象山, Collected Works of Lu Xiangshan [象山全集] (Taipei: Chung Wha Book Company, 1987), 23 Lu, Collected Works of Lu Xiangshan, fasc. 31, 5–6.24 Wang Shouren Shanghai Classics Publishing House, 2014), 109.王守仁, Collected Works of Wang Yangming [王阳明全集], ed. Wu Guang 吴光 et al. (Shanghai: 25 Ibid., 1058.26 Ibid., 132.T󰁫󰁥󰁡󰁬󰁟 󰁡 N󰁮󰁥 C󰁫󰁣󰁤󰁢󰁨󰁧󰁡󰁣 D󰁫󰁨󰁭󰁬󰁧󰁣󰁮 󰁫󰁤 O󰁢󰁭󰁮󰁬 K󰁧󰁣󰁺󰁝󰁧󰁣󰁮󰁪󰁪purity of one’s motives. Fourth, in whatever position one occupies, one must carry out whatever it is that needs to be done and carry it through to the end. Fi󰁯oneself attentively to whatever public a󰁱 h, one must apply re󰁳 ecting on oneself in a timely way. airs derive from that, always studying earnestly and distinction between rectitude and pro󰁲In the 󰁲 rst two of these items, we can see the in󰁳 uence of the Confucian and Mencian a moral mind, as Mencius taught, they are also easily swayed by their passions, Lu said t. Recognizing that although people do indeed have that the virtue of rectitude is inborn in all people but that few people have true experience of it, their resolve being torn away by external things.27to discerning and establishing one’s ambition as the deciding factor that would make the 󰁴 us it was that Lu gave primacy di󰁱utilitarian values. erence between a perfected person and an ordinary person, between moral values and do is re󰁳On the third point, Lu thought that a󰁯 er establishing one’s ambition, the next thing to into material desire or failing to correct what one knows to be a fault. “Some fall into ruin ect constantly as appropriate to the occasion, thinking about whether one is lapsing and material desire and cannot correct themselves. What greater disgrace could there be?”28Apart from this, whatever works one carries out must adhere to rectitude, and everything from motive to behavior must be founded on moral values. As Lu said,One must then discriminate one’s ambitions, for people’s realization derives from their practices, and these derive from their ambitions. If one’s ambition is for rectitude, then one’s practices must adhere to that, and thus so too must one’s realization. 󰁴true, go un-discriminated.mutatis mutandis29, for one whose ambition is pro󰁲 t. 󰁴 us our ambitions are not to e same is values, carried out completely and with ceaseless improvement: “When the great beginning As for the fourth point, Lu urged that the conduct of one’s a󰁱 airs must rest on moral is clear and one’s direction set, then are good and rectitude known. One should move them forward every day, make virtue daily ever-new and cause the great work to prosper with every new day.”30about one’s attendant responsibilities. For Wang, On the 󰁲 󰁯 h point, Wang Yangming emphasized being attentive to and conscientious 󰁴 is example will su󰁶 ce,liangzhi is made manifest in responsibility. One of the Master’s subordinate o󰁶a wonderful teaching, but I am so beset with paperwork and cases that I have no way to cials, who had long heard his teachings, said, “󰁴 is is practice it.” Hearing this, the Master said, “When have I ever taught you airy teachings that are separate from paperwork and cases?! Since you have an o󰁶learn from your o󰁶 cial job, you should a case, you may not give rise to anger even if someone answers you discourteously. You cial work. 󰁴 at alone is real rectifying of thoughts. When you hear may not give rise to happiness when someone is glib. You may not deal extra harshly with someone who irritates you by being ingratiating or bend to those who wheedle. You may not render a hasty ruling because your docket is overloaded. You may not punish a person falsely accused to gain favor with others. All of these intentions are sel󰁲only you can detect them in yourself. You must seek them out scrupulously and correct sh, and them, fearing only that you might leave a hair’s breadth of crookedness in yourself. 󰁴is what it means to investigate things and extend is nothing other than the real [moral] learning. 󰁴liangzhi. Paperwork, cases, and trials are these everyday a󰁱 airs.”31 ere would be nothing to learn without 27 Lu, Collected Works of Lu Xiangshan, fasc. 32, 4.28 Ibid., 3.29 Lu, Collected Works of Lu Xiangshan, fasc. 23, 2.30 Lu, Collected Works of Lu Xiangshan, fasc. 6, 1.31 Wang, Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 107–108.3940C󰁫󰁣󰁤󰁢󰁨󰁧󰁡󰁣 A󰁨󰁡󰁟󰁮󰁠󰁞 V󰁫󰁝.󰁜, N󰁫.󰁛 (2018)Wang thought that his philosophy of magistrate investigating cases, it was necessary to ensure a just procedure and outcome and liangzhi was no mere talk about self-cultivation. For a keep one’s rulings unin󰁳 uenced by sel󰁲 shness and arbitrariness. dichotomy between inner sageliness and outer kingliness and so implicitly place the When worldly people talk about meritorious works, too often they make a false discussion on a foundation of utilitarian values and reasoning. Wang criticized such people for exalting the Five Hegemons of the Spring and Autumn period (771–476 BCE) and works of Su Qin people were only considering those men’s outward accomplishments and not their inability 苏秦 (d. 284 BCE) and Zhang Yi 张仪 (d. 310 BCE), saying that these to act from their original, moral mind. “When the Five Hegemons repelled the barbarians and honored the Zhou dynasty, they were acting from selfish motives, not an adherence to doing right.”32and acknowledged that they may even have had glimpses of the wondrous functioning of He noted their genius for understanding people and communicating liangzhipeople who seemed outwardly modest and courteous might really be seeking honors and , but they used it not for good purposes but for great deeds.33 He also thought that fame, and that and exhibit reverent prudence and determined e󰁱truly modest people display real self-e󰁱 ort.34 acement, follow their original mind, believed that inner sageliness and outer kingliness ought not be split apart but rather are What is unique about Lu–Wang view on meritorious accomplishment is that they both properly one whole. When cultivating the person, one ought to do so diligently; when it is time for managing the family, one ought to apply oneself to that task wholeheartedly; when handling the a󰁱point, let one rely entirely on the original mind and the flowing of the heavenly principle airs of one’s country, let one pour one’s whole heart into the work; at every of morality. As Lu Xiangshan once said, “In any social interaction, when handling affairs, studying and researching, whether one is in motion or stillness, . . . there are no a󰁱our outside of the Way and no Way that exists beyond affairs.”35 airs that believed that all a󰁱heavenly principle, a state that could become commonplace to a sage, accommodating always airs should be conducted with full attention and in accordance with the Wang Yangming also the Way of the Mean and never careless.36the midst of song, sex, trade, and pro󰁲lapse, then even those things are nothing other than the 󰁳 t. If “󰁴liangzhi e only place that can be extended to the utmost, without any liangzhi has to do its work is in 󰁴 owing of the heavenly principle.”37 court over a dispute, he handled it in an unusual way, not by arriving at a verdict as to who us when Wang once encountered a case of a man and his son who brought one another to was in the right and who in the wrong, but by sagaciously opening their eyes to the familial tragedy that unfolding for them and transforming their intra-familial strife back into love.38between rectitude and profit and advocated following one’s original, moral mind to do as To summarize, then, Lu and Wang inherited Confucius’s and Mencius’s distinction one ought in one’s role, cleaving to moral values and not utilitarian ones. Such a perspective on meritorious works is a sagely one, fusing inner sageliness and outward kingliness as one whole distinguished into separate aspects only by what is appropriate to each occasion. 󰁴emphasized the heavenly principle of morality where motive, process, and outcome were ey concerned, without calculation of personal gain. Thus anyone who might think that they 32 Wang, Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 137.33 Ibid., 130.34 Ibid., 204–205.35 Lu, Complete Works of Lu Xiangshan, fasc. 35, 31.36 Wang, Complete Works of Wang Yangming, 137.37 Ibid., 139.38 Ibid., 127.T󰁫󰁥󰁡󰁬󰁟 󰁡 N󰁮󰁥 C󰁫󰁣󰁤󰁢󰁨󰁧󰁡󰁣 D󰁫󰁨󰁭󰁬󰁧󰁣󰁮 󰁫󰁤 O󰁢󰁭󰁮󰁬 K󰁧󰁣󰁺󰁝󰁧󰁣󰁮󰁪󰁪prized only inward sageliness and slighted meritorious works should understand that they did indeed talk about meritorious works, only not in the common sense but in an exalted sense. Conclusion [39]When Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan explained Lu–Wang philosophy, they emphasized the two men’s teachings on cultivation of virtue and the functioning of these are the hallmarks of their philosophy. However, they also made it easy for later liangzhi, and truly generations to mistake them as being concerned all with outer kingliness. When we return to the sources, this is certainly the emphasis of only with inner sageliness and hardly at the Lu–Wang School of the Mind. But by re-examining the way the two philosophers took up the Confucian and Mencian view of meritorious works, we can engage with posterity’s misimpressions about Tang’s and Mou’s interpretations, with Lu’s own encounters with skeptics who saw Confucians’ talk of benevolence and rectitudewith the early Qing scholars’ suspicions about Wang Yangming’s teachings. as empty talk, and even and they emphasized that the decisive factor was 󰁲The goal that Lu and Wang were pursuing was to become like the sages and worthies, of this great Way of sages and worthies is the original moral mind, which pursues the diligent rst establishing one’s ambition. 󰁴 e source practice of virtue, and the distinction between inner sageliness and outer kingliness is just a matter of setting: personal cultivation in one setting, management of worldly a󰁱 airs in another.present day, there are three points on which to exercise care. First, there are di󰁱For one who wishes to develop the Confucian teachings on meritorious works in the to de󰁲third, there are different points of entry into Confucian teachings on meritorious works. ne it. Second, we must a󰁶 rm that Confucianism does indeed take it seriously. And erent ways Lu and Wang took theirs from Confucius’s and Mencius’s sagely perspective, which was entirely di󰁱one may fall back into misunderstanding Lu and Wang as inattentive to meritorious works; erent from the common, worldly perspective. If this is not understood clearly, or one could a󰁶concept of meritorious works in which to know is to do, and this would not be consonant rm that they did indeed care about them but then develop a revolutionary’s with Lu’s and Wang’s dictates.and so it is essential to reacquaint ourselves with Lu and Wang. To summarize, they o󰁱A contemporary philosophy of meritorious works is liable to veer toward utilitarianism, four lessons to us moderns: First, establishing our ambitions, or con󰁲 er our decisive values; second, daring to resolutely take up the burden of doing what ought to rming for ourselves be done and avoiding what ought not to be done; third, constant self-re󰁳we are truly acting in accordance with our original moral mind; fourth, when the work is ection on whether done, setting it down and not dwelling in pride and seeking credit for ourselves. In other words, we are meant to have such ambitions as befit a modern values, not to count the pro󰁲junzi, to respect moral respond only to moral motives, do what needs to be done, re󰁳 t and loss to ourselves, to act appropriately to the occasion, to relinquish pridefulness in our accomplishments, and refrain from petty calculations about ect on ourselves constantly, gain or loss and vulgar considerations. Meritorious accomplishments in this sense are alone the great moral mission of Confucianism.Translated by Jason T. Clower  Jason T. Clower is associate professor of comparative religion at California State University, Chico.41